Reflections on Bach and Harnish’s Pragmatic Theory

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Abstract: This paper investigates the contributions of Bach and Harnish’s theory to the literature of pragmatics with a view to locating the strengths and weaknesses of the theory. The Pragma-crafting Theory constitutes the theoretical framework of the investigation. Theories of pragmatics are theoretical frameworks which explain the message-context-driven use of linguistic and extra-linguistic elements of communication. Such theories are immersed in communication and speech act theories. This paper finds that Bach and Harnish’s theory does not only provide insights on different strategies for communicating messages in discourse, but also explicates the dynamics of decoding meanings via speaker-hearer shared knowledge; the theory shows that communication cannot take place unless at least two agents are actively involved. However, the paper concludes that their theory places too much emphasis on speaker’s intention, literal and non-literalness of utterances at the expense of other forces in communication.

Keywords: Bach and Harnish’s theory, Pragma-crafting Theory, pragmatics, critique, speech acts, mutual contextual beliefs

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper is essentially a critique of Bach and Harnish’s theory. Their efforts in the literature of pragmatics are impressive. Theories of pragmatics include Austin (1962), Searle (1969), Sadock (1974), Grice (1975), Bach and Harnish (1979), Adegbija (1982), Mey (2000) and Acheoah (2015). Classical and contemporary theories of pragmatics elucidate speech act phenomenon, and thus, investigate the roles of a wide range of other pragmatic forces (implicatures, presuppositions, mutual contextual beliefs, speakers’ intentions, etc.) in communications across genres. Our goal in this paper is to locate the extent that Bach and Harnish’s theoretical framework facilitates the understanding or interpretation of discourse when verbal and non-verbal elements of communication are engaged in the event.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Besides Bach and Harnish’s pragmatic theory, reference is made to other pragmatic theories in the critique done in this paper. Therefore, I examine such other theories briefly. However, Bach and Harnish’s theory which is the focus of this paper is elaborately discussed.

2.1 Austin’s Theory

Austin (1962) contends that words are indeed, actions because in uttering certain words in certain contexts, actions are performed, but with the fulfilment of felicity conditions. He categorizes speech act into locutionary act (performing an act OF saying something); illocutionary act (performing an act IN saying something); and perlocutionary act (performing an act BY saying something).

2.2 Searle’s Theory

Searle’s theory explains communication as a rule-governed process. According to him, participants obey the rules of communication intentionally. Searle (1969) distinguishes “illocutionary acts” which he regards as the “complete” speech acts, from “perlocutionary acts” which concern the consequences or effects of illocutionary acts on hearers. Searle classifies rules into two: regulative rules and constitutive rules. His speech act taxonomy is one of the
attempts to refine Austin's and this taxonomy is based on “illocutionary point”, “direction of fit” and “sincerity conditions” (as well as other features including the role of authority, discourse relations, etc.).

2.3 Sadock’s Theory

Sadock’s (1974) theory is purely linguistic. He contends that explicit performatives make it clear that illocutionary forces cannot be ruled out of speech act theories. He proposes the Abstract Performative Analysis which is based on certain assumptions; see Sadock (ibid.) for extensive discussion on these assumptions.

2.4 Grice’s Theory

Grice (1975) proposes the Co-operative Principle. He contends that human interactions have to exemplify conversational maxims. Modern linguists make reference to H. P. Grice’s article: “Logic and Conversation”, published in 1975. In this article a lot is said about the Co-operative Principle (CP). The maxims are as follows:

1. Quantity: This controls the amount of information that is just enough and sufficient – not more, not less.
2. Quality: This does not permit false utterance.
3. Relation: This says the utterance must be relevant to the topic under discussion.
4. Manner: This relates to how something is said; avoid ambiguity, be brief and be orderly. The CP is a quasi-contractual agreement entered into when one engages in conversation.

Features distinguishing the CP operation are:

1. The participants have some common immediate aim;
2. The contributions of the participants should be dovetailed, mutually dependent;
3. There is some sort of undertaking (which may be explicit but which is often tacit) that, other things being equal, the transaction should continue in appropriate style unless both parties are agreeable that it should terminate (Grice 1975:48).

Grice evolves two categories of implicature: conversational and conventional implicatures. Conversational implicatures are generated when the Co-operative Principle is violated. They exist in utterances where a speaker means more than what he says, and they are essentially like indirect speech acts (cf. Bach and Harnish 1979). Conventional implicatures on the other hand, are lexeme-dependent.

2.5 Bach and Harnish’s Theory

The approach of Kent Bach and Robert M. Harnish to Speech Act is intention-inference-based. They contend that for speakers to perform illocutionary acts, it is intended that listeners have the understanding of the acts via MCBs (mutual contextual beliefs). It is their claim that the act of conversation or interactional talk has to involve an inferential process. Their terminology, “Speech Act Schemata (SAS)” refers to an inevitable part of the inferential process in a communicative event. They contend that mutual contextual beliefs between a speaker and his hearer facilitate a the inferential process, as the inference made or is expected to be made by the hearer does not depend on what the speaker says but on the contextual knowledge shared commonly by the speaker and hearer in discourse (p.15). To infer what a speaker says, the hearer depends also on the Presumption of Literatures (PL). The hearer should know when the linguistic communication of the speaker is within or without the bounds of literalness, and if the speaker is speaking in a non literal dimension, the hearer should not only acknowledge it, but should also be able to understand what such speech by the speaker means; he should have a mastery of the acts in the speaker’s non-literal language. The non-literal language involves the use of indirect speech acts.

Apart from MCBs, Bach and Harnish recognize other types of beliefs (shared by an entire linguistic community) which the hearer relies on to make inferences. These are:

(i) Linguistic Presumption (LP); and
(ii) Communicative Presumption (CP).
Linguistic Presumption (LP) refers to the moral belief that members of a Linguistic Community (LC) share on the particular language (L) in question. Therefore, any expression (e) uttered by a member to any member of the community, is taken by S (speaker) for granted; that is, S presupposes that the hearer (H) will be able to identify what is being said. Whenever a member, S, says something in L to another member H, he is doing so with some known illocutionary intent (p. 7). If H does not think the (CP) is operative then H has no grounds to infer any illocutionary intent from S's utterance.

In Bach and Harnish’s framework, an act is communicatively successful as soon as the hearer recognizes the speaker’s illocutionary intention. Therefore, “the intended effect of an act of communication is not just any effect produced by means of recognition of the intention to produce certain effects on (or in) the hearer.” To buttress this claim, Bach and Harnish point out that indirectness, for instance, may have a perlocutionary effect such as protecting the hearer’s feelings or making him suspicious. Also, they consider perlocutionary effects to be beyond the scope of communication because “there is no limit to what can result from speech acts” (p.17). Hence, unlike earlier scholars, they distinguish between communication and what happens as a result of it. They restricted perlocutionary acts to effects produced intentionally, arguing that only intentionally produced effects constitute the reason for a given speech act such as joking, manipulating, boring, interrupting, etc. some of which, although intentional, are not generated from inferences based on the SAS and, in some cases, assume the suspension of the CP.

Bach and Harnish recognize several types of strategies in the inferential process:

a. Locutionary Strategy – the hearer's inference from the locutionary act or the utterance per se and what the utterance means in L. This is based on H’s knowledge of the language, the LP, the CP and MCBs.

b. Direct Literal Strategy – H infers from the PL whether or not S means what he says and nothing else. This helps H to identify the act.

c. Direct Based Indirect Strategy – H depends on the MCBs, CP, and the utterance to determine whether, under the circumstance there is some action connected with the literal utterance.

d. Direct Non-literal Strategy – from the MCBs, CP, and the utterance, H’s knowledge of the literal meaning of the utterance, H infers that S’s utterance must be non-literal and indirect since another act is connected with the overt one which H recognizes.

e. Non-literally Based Indirect Strategy – The CP, the utterance, and MCBs lead H to infer that S's utterance must be non-literal and indirect since another illocutionary act is connected with it.

A literally based indirect strategy is exemplified when S says “My mouth is parched.” In this utterance S literally informs H that his mouth is parched and also indirectly requests a drink (in the context in which such a sentence is uttered after a hard day's labour). Strategies d and e can be illustrated by an utterance in which S, a mother, says to her son, “I am sure the cat likes having its tail pulled,” – uttered intentionally to directly and non-literally state that S is sure that the cat does not like having its tail pulled, and indirectly requests H to stop pulling the cat’s tail (pp. 73-74). The SAS chart is used by Bach and Harnish to explain the fact that H uses his knowledge of the language used by S along with MCBs, CP and PL to infer whether or not a particular utterance is literal or direct. If H concludes that S is speaking non-literally, he seeks an alternative explanation for the utterance.

Bach and Harnish emphasize that indirect illocutionary acts are usually performed subordinately to other illocutionary acts. For example, if S says “My mouth is parched,” S, as noted above, may be informing H that his mouth is parched and at the same time requesting a drink. The first act is instrumental to the successful performance of the second, and therefore, for the second act to secure uptake, the first must be recognized. This discussion embraces both literal and non-literal acts.

The symbols \textit{MCBS CP, PL, L} etc. are the same as have been introduced thus far in our discussion of Bach and Harnish. The notation \textit{F-ing that P} represents literally performed illocutionary acts; \textit{say that P} refers to making a particular proposition or expressing a particular attitude. O is an arbitrarily chosen notation for another illocutionary act different from the literal one.
BASIS

Locutionary Strategy

L 1 S is uttering e hearing S utter e

L 2 S means ... by e L1, LP and MCBS

L 3 S is saying that *(... P ...) L2, LP and MCBS

L 4 S, if speaking literally, Is F*-ing that P. L3, CP, MCBS

Either (Direct Literal)

L5 S could be F*-ing that P L4, MCBS

L6 S is F*-ing that P L5, PL

And Possibly (Literal Based Indirect)

L7'S could merely F*-ing that P L6, MCBs

L8 There is some F –ing that P connected in a way identified under the circumstances to F*-ing that P, such that in F*-ing that P, S could also be F-ing that P. L7', CP

L9 S is F*-ing that P and thereby F*-ing that P. L8, MCBs

Or (Direct Non-literal)

L5' S could not (under the circumstance) be F*-ing that P. L4, MCBs

L6' Under the circumstance there is a certain recognizable relation R between saying that P and some F-ing that P, such that S could be F-ing that P. L3, L5', CP

L7 S is F-ing that P. L6', MCBs

And Possibly (Literally Based Indirect)

L8' S could not merely be F-ing that P. L7, MCBs

L9' There is some F'-ing that O connected in a way identifiable under the circumstances to F-ing
that P, such that in F-ing that P, S could also be F'-ing that O. L10' S is F-ing that P and thereby F'-ing that O.

The above elaborated version of the SAS shows that for H to identify an illocutionary act, he has to infer L1 and then apply selected inference strategies to the utterance (p.77).

Bach and Hamish’s theory emphasize the need for the hearer to recognize a speaker’s intention which they call “Reflexive-intentions” (R-intentions). To communicate according to them, is to express an attitude such as belief, an intention, a desire, etc., and “For S to express an attitude is for S to R-intend the hearer to think S has that attitude” (p.15). The theory establishes two broad categories of illocutionary acts: communicative and non-communicative. While the former requires the recognition of S’s R-intention, the latter does not. In their theory, there are four main categories of communicative illocutionary acts: Constatives, Directives, Commissives and Acknowledgements. These four main categories correspond roughly to Austin’s Expositives, Exercitives, Commissives, and Behabitives respectively and closely to Searle’s Representatives (Assertives), Directives, Commissives and Expressives, differing mainly in their characterizations. There are two classes of non-communicative illocutionary acts: Effectives and Verdictives, corresponding roughly to Searle’s Declarations. A detailed account of the categories established by Bach and Harnish are speech acts which express the speaker’s belief and intention, or, at least the implication or desire, that the hearer form (or continue to hold) a like belief (p.42). Fifteen subcategories of this group are recognized as follows: Assertives, Informatives, Confirmatives, Concessives, Retractive, Assentives, Dissentives, Disputatives, Responsives, Suggestives and Suppositives (Ibid. pp42-46).

Assertives are characterized by S’s expression of belief that the hearer (H) also believes that P. “Examples of verbs denoting Assertives speech acts are affirm, allege, assert, aver, avow, declare, and deny (p.42).

Informatives are speech acts in which S expresses the belief that P and also “the intention that H form the belief that P.” Examples are advise, announce, apprise, disclose, inform, insist, notify, point out, report, reveal, tell, and testify (p.42).

In Descriptives, S declares that a particular quality is possessed by a person, place or thing. That is, S expresses “the belief that O is F” and “the intention that H believes that O is F” (p.42). Examples are appraise, assay, call, categorize, characterize, classify, date, describe, diagnose, evaluate, etc. (p.42).

In directives, the speaker’s attitude toward a future action by the hearer (H) and the speaker’s intention or desire that H consider his utterance as reason to act (A) is expressed (p.47). Six subcategories of illocutionary acts are listed under this category: Requestives, Questions, Requirements, Prohibitives, Permissives and Advisories.

Questions are “special cases of requests in that what is requested is that the hearer provides the speaker with certain information” (p.48). A speech act is considered a question if S expresses “the desire that H tells S whether or not P” and “intention that H tells S whether or not P because of S’s desire” (p.47). Examples of verb in this category are ask, interrogate, question, questions, quiz, etc.

Advisories, they explain, is a speech act in which the speaker expresses the belief that “there is (sufficient) reason for H to A,” and “the intention that H takes S’s belief as (sufficient) reason for him to A” (p.48). Examples are advise, caution, counsel, propose, recommend, suggest, urge, warn, etc.

The third major category of speech acts established by Bach and Harnish is “Commissives” – acts involving the undertaking of an obligation or proposal to undertake an obligation. Two main types of this category are distinguished: Promises and Offers. S promises H to A if S expresses “the belief that his utterance obligates him to A”, “the intention to A”, and “the intention that H believes that S’s utterance obligates S to A, and that S intends to A”
Contracting, Guaranteeing, etc. are examples of this category. Promise includes swear, vow, surrender, and guarantee.

A speech act is said to be an Offer if S expresses “the belief that S’s utterance obligates him to A on condition that H indicates he wants S to A” and “the intention that H believes that S’s utterance obligates S to A and that S intends to A on condition that H indicates he wants S to A” (p.50). Examples of verbs denoting speech acts in this category are volunteer, offer, and propose.

Acknowledgements are the final category of Bach and Harnish’s communicative illocutionary acts. They are very common in day-to-day interaction. They express perfunctorily, if not genuinely, certain feelings toward the hearer” (p.51). Examples of verbs denoting members of this category are greet, thank, condole, apologize, congratulate, etc.

Bach and Harnish’s non-communicative (or conventional) illocutionary acts are divided into two classes: Effectives and Verdictives.

2.6 Adegbija’s Theory

Adegbija’s (1982) theory is anchored by two concepts: Master Speech Act and Pragmsociolinguistic concepts. It is an improvement on Bach and Harnish’s theory. The Master Speech Act incorporates the totality of the layers of meaning which utterances have. The Pragmsociolinguistic concept on the other hand, has to do with the pragmatic, social and linguistic aspects of context, which generate textual meaning.

2.7 Mey’s Pragmatic Theory

In Mey’s Pragmatic Act Theory, “Pragmeme” anchors “activity” and “textual” components of discourse (cf. Mey 2000). The activity part shows the roles of the participants of discourse (interactants) while the textual part concerns the various contextual variables that interplay in discourse situations.

2.8 Acheoah’s Pragmatic Theory

In the Pragma-crafting Theory (cf. Acheoah 2015) “crafting” has to do with the discourse strategies which participants of discourse employ in the structuring of communication units. Utterances are produced through the goal-driven patterning of sentences in particular forms. It begins from the micro level as a unit of discourse, and extends to the macro level as a body of discourse. Every Pragma-crafting (P-crafting) involves “illocrafting”, “uptake” and “sequel”. Therefore, P-crafting is a super-ordinate pragmatic act which produces linguistic and extra-linguistic elements of communication. At different stages of a communicative event, there is a candidate for inference (meaning). At every such stage, the interactive and non-interactive participants explore P-crafting Features (inference features).

3. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

This study hinges on the Pragma-crafting Theory in investigating the strengths and weaknesses of Bach and Harnish’s theory. The Pragma-crafting theory is anchored by the following concepts:

(i) P-crafting: It is a two-fold umbrella term: it comprises Event and Text.

(ii) Event: The participants of discourse (interactive and non-interactive participants) constitute Event. While the interactive participants perform linguistic, extra-linguistic and psychological acts, the non-interactive participants do not, and even if they do, their acts are always unconnected to the communication at hand; see Acheoah (2014) where the label, H_x, is used to refer to participants who are present in discourse, but are not speakers’ interlocutors.

(iii) Text: Text captures the trio: Setting, Theme and P-crafting Features. “P-crafting Features” is a concept which has discrete theoretical notions demonstrated by the interactive participants in three different frames: linguistic acts, extra-linguistic acts and psychological acts.

(iv) Interactive participants: These are participants who make linguistic, extra-linguistic and psychological contributions to a communication event.
(v) Non-interactive participants: Although present in a communication event, the non-interactive participants do not make verbal or non-verbal contributions that concern the communication event.

(vi) Setting: This is the physical place in which a communicative event takes place as can be ascertained from pragmatic or linguistic data.

(vii) Theme: It is the message in Text as worked out by P-crafting Features.

(viii) P-crafting Features: The features which enable participants of discourse to “p-craft” include: Indexicals (INDXLs), Shared Macro-knowledge (SMK), Shared Contextual Knowledge (SCK), Shared Knowledge of Emergent Context (SKEC), Geoimplicatures (GIs), Linguistic Implicatures (LIs), Behavioural Implicatures (BIs), Contextual Presuppositions (CPs), Pragmadeviants (PDs), Object Referred (OR) and Operative Language (OL). It is necessary to understand these concepts:

a) Inference (INFR) has to do with making logical conclusions from available contextual data.

b) Indexicals (INDXLs) include demonstratives, first and second person pronouns, tense, specific time and place adverbs like now and here, and a variety of other grammatical features tied directly to the circumstances of utterance (Levinson 1983:54).

c) Shared Macro-knowledge (SMK) is the totality of what the participants of discourse understand as states-of-affairs in the larger society, rather than in their immediate society.

d) Shared Contextual Knowledge (SCK) is background knowledge of participants in the physical context of communication.

e) Emergent Context (EC) is any situation that suddenly emerges in an on-going discourse, and can impinge on illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.

f) Geoimplicatures (GIs) was coined from “geographical” and “implicature” to refer to practices that have geographical restriction in terms of people, and not just in terms of physical boundaries; physical relocation does not remove the meanings from the psyche of the natives of that region where such meanings operate as OR in OL.

g) Linguistic Implicature (LI) are meanings implied through linguistic elements (language) of Text.

h) Behavioural Implicature (BI) are meanings implied through extra-linguistic and psychological acts.

i) Contextual Presuppositions (CP) are products of Shared Contextual Knowledge (SCK); in a specific (micro-context) physical context of discourse, participants deduce meanings from verbal and non-verbal data limited to the participants themselves. The meanings deduced are treated as background assumptions (BAs) which direct interlocutory roles. Decoders (DCs) imply that Encoders (ENCs) understand that certain Verbal Elements (VEs) and Non-verbal Elements (NVEs) are deduced or inferred as Object Referred (OR) in Operative Language (OL).

j) Linguistic Acts: These include: speech acts (direct, indirect and Pragmadeviants); supra-segmental features (stress, intonation, rhythm, pitch); phones (Ssss, Shhh, Mmmm, Ehmnn); Exclamations (Wao!, Oh!, Ah!, Abah!); and lyrical music. Due to space constraints, these concepts as well as others cannot be elaborately explained in this study. However, the concept, “phones”, refers to speech features between the phoneme and the word. They are common components in both written and spoken discourses. Small as they are, they express emotions of various kinds besides having illocutionary potentials in context.

k) Extra-linguistic Acts: Extra-linguistic acts include: sociolinguistic variables (age, cultural background, social status/class, gender, relationship); non-lyrical music, drumming as well as semiotic particulars (weather, time, contextual object, colour, clothing, posture, perfume, location/position, size, body mark and silence), laughter, body movement.

l) Psychological Acts: These are the different emotions expressed through linguistic and extra-linguistic acts. See Acheoah (ibid. p.23) for the diagram which reveals the concepts in the Pragma-crafting Theory.
4. A CRITIQUE OF BACH AND HARNISH’S THEORY

4.1 Strengths

Bach and Harnish’s theory is a springboard for the understanding of how speech acts mean in contexts; it shows that a referent must mean x (I mean a definite, but infinite category) in context before the participants can communicate effectively. This aligns with the view in semantics that the referents precede the referring expressions – thus, speech acts are performed in accordance with some conventions which make them institutional acts.

Bach and Harnish’s theory presents the inferential process as a participant-driven phenomenon. Thus, their theory can conveniently be placed in regional or cross-cultural pragmatics. Speech behaviour or norms of societies is supposed to determine the use of illocutionary acts. Allowing communication theories – which lack universality – to determine the use and meaning of language is problematic. Communication is “trying to make your listeners capture the idea in your mind.” Pragmatics is relevant to various disciplines with a stake on how utterances are understood. Even when there are underlying universals of language use, cross-cultural components of communication remain crucial to the pragmatic analyst.

Indeed, the relationship between language and social reality is no debate. However, Bach and Harnish’s theory is bereaved of a comprehensive elucidation of cross-cultural pragmatics. A cross-cultural approach rather than a linguistic approach to speech act theory shows the nature of meaning in discourse. In this regard, much improvement is needed to make Bach and Harnish (1979) a theory that depicts the ethnography of speaking.

It is interesting that their theory does not restrict the use of speech acts to linguistic conventions. It shows that extra-linguistic forces are paramount in any meaningful use of illocutionary acts in human communications. Thus, I align with the idea that communication is the only function or the only essential function of language. Other functions of language are derivative (in the history of the race or of the individual) from the communicative function; every language is essentially used in communication. In a communicative event, the speakers direct illocutionary acts at institutional or interpersonal communicative goals. At the underlying level, language, whether used in interpersonal or institutional communication, is used to communicate ideologies or desires.

Bach and Harnish’s theory shows that: language and context interact; message-driven pragmatic choices determine how S shifts from formal properties of language to deviant forms; in doing this, S presupposes that H has relevant background knowledge of the Operative Language (Linguistic Implicature); Bach and Harnish (1979) stress that it is important for hearers to know whether or not speakers are within the bounds of literalness. The Pragm-crafting Theory shows that the whole idea of non-literalness in pragmatics can be summed up in the fact that messages and form do not have to be similar. Decoding messages is not satisfactory if linguistic data are used as the only inferential tools; thus, the Pragm-crafting Theory evolves several instruments for decoding meaning in diverse discourse genres. Despite the contextual nuances that inform the violation of linguistic “constants” (normative properties of language), the normative meanings of words and sentences in OL is not completely unconnected with what such words and sentences mean in speaker-meanings. For example, the sentence, “Ali is 419” (illocrafting) is first understood as a declarative (uptake) by H who has first-hand, normative knowledge of context-driven meaning of “419” in Nigeria: “a fraudulent person”. The communion between syntax and extra-sentential properties of communication shows that the dynamic functions of human language is instrumental to investigating the syntactic rules of language.

Bach and Harnish’s theory helps to explain vital components of natural communication: what words mean, what the speaker literally says when using them, and what the speaker means or intends to communicate by using those words, which often goes considerably beyond what is said: What someone says is determined by the conventional meaning of the sentence uttered and contextual processes of disambiguation and reference-making. What the speaker implicates can be calculated from some rational principles and maxims governing conversation. What is said is connected to the literal content of the utterance, whereas what is implicated (the implicature) is connected to the non-literal component (what is intentionally communicated without being covertly said by the speaker). Apart from linguistic knowledge, contextual information plays a role in determining what is said. Despite the potential of language to mean beyond the sentence, messages reflect physical form, in which case, mastery of
linguistic conventions is instrumental to pragmatic or extra-linguistic communication. The most useful notion of saying is that what is said should be closely related to the conventional meaning of the uttered sentence.

Bach and Harnish’s theory accommodates non-literal use of language. Thus, their theory is equipped with the potentials to explain indirect speech acts and presupposition. If a boy tells an elderly man (his co-passenger in a taxi): “It’s tight here, let me get to the back seat,” an indirect speech act is registered; this boy wants to be polite, and speaks thus, instead of saying: “Sir, it’s tight here, can you go to the back seat?” It is particularly fascinating that different non-literal communicative strategies are presented in Bach and Harnish’s Speech Act Schemata. The Pragma-crafting Theory uses the Illocutionary Frames Principle (IFP) to explain the different illocutionary strategies which speakers explore in communicative events as they rely on background assumptions. According to Levinson (ibid.) the ordinary notion of presupposition should be used to describe any kind of background assumption … theory expression or utterance makes sense or is rational.

4.2 Weaknesses

Bach and Harnish’s theory does not explicate the forces which facilitate the hearers’ ability to locate literal and non-literal dimensions of utterances. Rather, it emphasizes the idea that speakers should make hearers understand utterances as being literal or non-literal. So long as shared knowledge between S and H determines language use in their framework, then there is really no need for S to continually process utterances to reveal meaning in on-going discourse. For example, H’s ability to know whether or not S’s speech is outside the bounds of literalness depends on several factors, and one of such factors is H’s religious position. To capture how extra-linguistic forces determine meaning in discourse, the Pragma-crafting Theory relies on “sociolinguistic variables”. The theory also shows that non-literalness, speakers’ intention and mutual contextual beliefs (which are the core of Bach and Harnish’s theory) are merely part of the many forces that impinge on meaning in human communication. For example, the Pragma-crafting locates the place of the “setting” of a speech event in effective communication. For example, indirect speech acts function as direct speech acts when used in Christendom. Language use in Christendom is informed by faith in God, and so a Christian speaker may say to another Christian interlocutor: “You are strong” or “It is well,” regardless of the encoder’s awareness of the fact that the decoder is seriously ill. I therefore define illocutionary force as “that attitude with which an encoder encodes an utterance, regardless of the physical properties of the utterance.” So, when S says “It is well,” S is not being funny, but praying, commanding, requesting, believing, declaring, pronouncing, exercising, etc. Apart from indirect speech acts, direct speech acts such as commands, that are infelicitous outside Christendom, because the speaker lacks the authority or position to command, are felicitous in Christendom. God (the Bible), says Christians should command Him by His word when they pray. So, Christians pray thus: “God, I command you by your word to bless me this year!” Hymes (1962) explains the conative function of language in which focus is on the person(s) addressed. Most typical of this function is the use of vocatives and imperatives to call the attention of another or requiring them to carry out some action. If S says to H, “It is well,” even though S knows that H is not well, H may, or may not interpret it as being outside the bounds of literalness. In other words, H may, or may not interpret it as an indirect speech act.

I strongly hold the view that the literal meaning of utterances cannot handle meaning. Thus, different kinds of contexts, presuppositions and implicatures are evolved in the Pragma-crafting Theory to facilitate the extraction of meaning from linguistic and non-verbal communication. Consider:

(i) Ade is in the hospital.
(ii) Ade is in the house.
(iii) I went to the toilet and forced myself.
(iv) I went to the market and forced myself.

In (i), the speaker means that “Ade is there as a patient or as a visitor of a patient”. In (ii), we are not made to attach any adverbial of reason to the sentence, because of its clear meaning, which is that “Ade is inside a place, which is the house”. In (iii), it is implied that “forced myself” means “struggling to pass out waste product (defecate or urinate). But (iv) on the other hand, is meaningless, because S needs to process the speech if H does not share with him, background knowledge that will facilitate decoding what is encoded (linguistic uptake phenomenon).
Figure 1 below shows different layers of meaning for these sentences:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UTTERANCES</th>
<th>LAYERS OF MEANING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Ade is in the hospital.</td>
<td>- (i) Ade is sick and admitted in the hospital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- (ii) Ade has gone to the hospital, but not as a patient.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Ade is in the house.</td>
<td>- (iii) Ade is inside a place, which is the house.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- (iv) Ade is in the particular house that x (where “that x” is a clause of shared knowledge between S and H).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) I went to the toilet and forced myself.</td>
<td>- (i) I went to pass out excreta but could not do it easily.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) I went to the market and forced myself.</td>
<td>- Meaningless (incoherent).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1: Layers of Meaning for Utterances**

Apart from processing (iv), if H shares mutual contextual knowledge with S, (iv) becomes meaningful e.g.:

S: Do you have toilet here?
H: The nearest toilet here is in the market, and it is a public one.
S: Let me hurry there. Even if it is dirty, I shall force myself.
H: How far? (after some minutes that S was back).
S: I went to the toilet and forced myself.
H: Poor you!

The non-relatedness of sentence properties to what is conveyed as message(s) in discourse is explainable via the specific P-crafting features that impinge on participants’ selection of linguistic and extra-linguistic elements of communication. Considering the roles of extra-linguistic elements of communication in conveying messages, it is worrisome that Bach and Harnish’s speech act theory does not explain the roles of non-verbal media of communication in discourse. In many speech situations, contextual objects (CO) are thematic, so the participants
may not necessarily utter many words for messages to be decoded. Bach and Harnish's SAS is lexeme-dependent, whereas the Pragma-crafting Theory shows that a participant's potent illocutionary strategy may be to hold specific objects in specific contexts, based on his illocutionary goals. If for example, a landlord wants his tenant to pay outstanding rents as soon as they meet, the entire landlord needs to do is to hold a big padlock and sit outside the gate of the house and await the tenant.

Speakers expect their utterances to produce responses – whether expected responses or not. This is part of communication rationale. It is obvious that a pragmatic theory such as that of Bach and Harnish that is mainly intention-based, is flawed by the fact that utterances produce perlocutionary acts not intended by speakers. The literature of pragmatics agrees that perlocutionary acts are not within the predictions of pragmatics because sequels are sometimes those unexpected. At this juncture, we seek refuge in Grice's example: if S asserts that p (e.g. the clouds are thickening for rain) and H takes steps to avert the consequences of the coming rain and hurts himself, his experience (perlocutionary effect of S's utterance was not intended by S) 2. Grice's sub-goal, at which the utterance “The clouds are thickening for rain” is directed, is to get the audience to believe that the speaker believes that it is to rain. From rationale reasoning, the decoder is expected to prepare to avert the rain, whether I have good and bad intentions for uttering p.

Bach and Harnish's theory does not present communication as a candidate for emergent context. Unless a pragmatic theory accommodates the implications of emergent context, speech acts cannot be successfully explained in terms of Austin's classifications of speech acts: locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Acheoah (2011) submits that in an emergent context (EC), uptake and perlocutionary acts are not those expected by a speaker, unless after the emergent context had become shared knowledge among the participants; this is the case even when utterances are literal, non-literal, and have been uttered with any of the illocutionary strategies in Bach and Harnish's SAS. If a teacher orders his student to go out of the class, unknown to him that the student has just been tied to the chair by his fellow student (emergent context), the student will not obey, in spite of the fact that the felicity condition is satisfactory: the discourse and participants are appropriate; the encoder in the position to perform the directive; S and H are aware that the utterance is a literal proposition. When it becomes clear to the teacher that the student disobeyed his order due to the emergent context – at this point, the emergent context has become shared knowledge of emergent context (SKEC) – we cannot say: that the student was rude or disobedient; that the utterance was not understood as literal or non-literal; that S's intention has not been made clear to H.

5. CONCLUSION

Bach and Harnish's theory depicts the intentional nature of human communication. Indeed, illocutionary acts have intrinsic motivators because the primary reason for performing them is speaker-dependent; speakers' direct illocutionary acts at states-of-affairs (mental states). Considering its strong position on speaker-hearer shared knowledge on literal and non-literal propositions, Bach and Harnish's theory is a strong depiction of communication as an event that presupposes a preparatory condition. Vanderveken (1990) opines that preparatory conditions are strict presuppositions of an illocutionary act. Conclusively, it is clear that Bach and Harnish’s theory which emphasizes the roles of speakers’ intentions, mutual contextual beliefs and utterance types (literal and non-literal propositions) will be more illuminating if it captures a wide range of phenomena that unfold in natural communication.

Notes

1. Other functions of language are subsumed in these categories of communication.

2. Although Austin himself who propounded perlocutionary act in his speech act taxonomy uses the term to capture both effects that are intended and unintended, there are scholars who contend that only intentionally performed acts constitute the reason for a given speech act, and for this reason, perlocutionary acts should be restricted to effects anticipated by S on H.

REFERENCES


Grice, H. P. (1975) “Logic and Conversation”. In Cole and Morgan (eds.)


