

The Role of Elites in the Economic Development of Some Communities of the North West Region of Cameroon

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Abstract: *The paper determines the contribution of elites of the North West Region of Cameroon to the economic development of their communities. By means of a structured questionnaire development associations rated the level of contribution of their elites to economic development. The analysis of the data showed that peace, elite participation, and quality of health care significantly and positively related to development. Government action was significant while non-governmental action was least significant. There exists a difference in the contribution of various types of elites to development. Home-based elites contribute more to development. An important conclusion is that, it is important for the communities to tap from the wealth and resources of their elite population in order to accelerate the development of their communities.*

Keywords: *Elite, Economic Development, North West Region, Cameroon*

1. INTRODUCTION

Power and influence have been considered differently by different people. Each year, nominations and voting for the most powerful and influential people in the world are done. Based on voting by a panel of FORBES editors (2015), who considered aspects such as financial resources, scope and use of power, and the number of people they impact, the Russian president was voted as the world's most powerful person, followed by U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

Usually those who feature in the above classification are heads of states who run nations with a combined GDP of some \$48 trillion, Chief Executive Officers and Chairs who control over \$3.6 trillion in annual revenues. Among them are founders, including the newcomer billionaires such as Alibaba's Jack Ma and Tencent's Ma Huateng.

In 2012, two women, Merkel and Yellen, were amongst the top 10 most powerful people in the world. In 2014 there were nine women on the list, representing 12% of the world's most powerful people despite the fact that they make up more than 50% of the world's population.

While the same number as last year, the inaugural list from 2009 included only three women leaders. Recently, re-elected Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff and South Korea President Park Geun-Hye join the world's most important as well as NGOs run by women – Christine Lagarde and Margaret Chan — and business leaders Ginni Rometty, Mary Barra and Gina Rinehart.

Some of the big business persons and entrepreneurs, emerging political leaders, rising corporate personalities from Africa have been seizing the opportunity of their influential position to turn the continent around. The Forbes list identifies African people who are innovative, courageous, daring and often progressive in their fields. The list highlights African entrepreneurs, corporate executives, and social entrepreneurs, political and civil leaders who are impacting the continent and the world, often times without much fanfare. Africa's emerging power brokers are

making a name for themselves and simultaneously changing their communities and the continent. In this list we have January Makamba, Tanzania, Deputy Minister of Communication, Science & Technology and Member of Parliament, Chinedu Echeruo, Nigeria, Tech Entrepreneur & Founder of Hopstop.com and Tripology.com, Mohammed Dewji, Tanzania, Group Chief Executive Officer of Mohammed Enterprises Tanzania Limited, Kola Karim, Nigeria, Group Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of Shoreline Energy International, Ashish J. Thakkar, Uganda, Founder and Managing Director of Mara Group, Mara Foundation and Mara Online, Mamadou Toure, Cameroon, Founder and Chairman of Africa 2.0, Amadou Mahtar Ba, Senegal, Founder and Chief Executive Officer of the African Media Initiative, Simdul Shagaya, Nigeria – Tech Entrepreneur and Founder of Konga.com and DealDey.com, Ben Magara, Zimbabwe, Chief Executive Officer and Director of Lonmin, and Komla Dumor, Ghana, Lead Presenter on “Focus On Africa” and BBC World News’ European morning segment.

In JeuneAfrique (N°2520-2521 of 26th April to 9th of May 2009), the Paris-based weekly magazine profiles 50 men and women whom it considers to be the most influential personalities in Cameroon. Divided into four main categories - politics, business, civil society, culture and the media - the vast majority of these individuals are part of the technocracy, now in its twilight years that came of age after Paul Biya became president in 1982 – “la generation des longs crayons” as JeuneAfrique puts it.

In the literature a number of themes relating elite action and economic development have been explored across different disciplines. Brezis and Temin (1999), and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) examined the influence of elites on the non-elites through their influence on institutions. Elsewhere Haggard and Kufman (1995) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) hold that elites are responsible for establishing and expanding democracy while to Carothers (1998) elites are responsible for institutions that affect governance. To Barrow (1998) elites are authors of practices that determine the business climate. Pye (1991) analyses how elites relate to non- elites and how this impacts their actions including their perception of poverty as well as risk perception. From the foregoing, it is clear that at all societal levels there are important people who enjoy a privilege status and exercise control over the society. Society’s resources or endowments are channelled to growth and development through the actions of these people called elites. Really economic development is an outcome and propeller of elites. Unfortunately, research in this domain, has not been tailored to capture the key role of elites in the development process. Really existing research does not throw enough light on the contribution of different categories of elites to the development of their communities and fail to determine whether this contribution is significant or not.

To this end, the current study examines the role of the elites amongst other factors such as peace, government action, non- government action and quality of health care services in the economic development of the grass field communities of the North West region of Cameroon. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: The second section situates the paper in its proper perspective by reviewing literature linking elites to development. The third section identifies data sources and discusses the method of analysis. The results are presented and discussed in section four. The final section concludes the paper with some policy recommendations.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Conceptual Framework

2.1 .1 The Elite

Pareto (1915/1935) considers elites to be the most talented and deserving individuals in a free society but who in real life use force and persuasion, enjoying inherited wealth and family connections amongst others. They are those who gain control of funds, information flows, promotions and organizational power. Elsewhere, Femia (2001) argues that elites are not necessarily those with superior endowments including organizational capacities but simply those who find themselves in advantage power positions. Higley (1988) holds that elites emerge in large collectivities where there is absence or low level of common interest necessitating authoritative decisions which are usually taken by the elites. In fact, elites are those who occupy strategic positions in society to be able to affect significantly political outcomes. From this political perspective, elites are at the top of the political, economic and social power (Putnam, 1976). This classification excludes from the elite class those with high occupational, educational and cultural status. Yenshu (2013: 299) expands the definition of elites to be “comprised of persons and groups who, by virtue of the power they hold or influence they wield, contribute to social and historical

developments within a community, either by the decisions they take, or the ideas, feelings and sentiments they express or symbolize". He goes further to differentiate amongst the following categories of elites: traditional, technocratic, Economic, Charismatic, Ideological, and Symbolic Elites. Traditional Elites enjoy influence and wield power as a result of ideas, beliefs or social structures which have their roots in a distant past and which have been enforced by a long tradition, that is, they have been handed down from generation to generation. In this category one would find traditional leaders (e.g. Fons, chiefs, obas, lamidos). Religious elites are partially traditional.

Technocratic elites have a legal and bureaucratic base while their authority derives from a selection process based on established criteria that is recognized and accepted. They are attributed a certain competence or aptitudes based on tests conducted on the basis of known criteria (specialised training, attribution of positions within a hierarchy in an organisation). Technocratic elites are composed of the highest echelon of administrators in the government (public sector) and private sector. According to Weber (1964), these elites wield rational-legal power. In this regard, they are more authoritative than influential. In the modern world, they have been very powerful because of developments in bureaucracy and industry.

Economic elites derive their importance from the goods or property they possess and are likely to influence employment policy at the level of government and even put pressure on the other types of elites. This is typical of the relationship between politicians and businessmen. In this category one would find the great landowners, industrialists, bankers or traders whose decisions can influence the political and often social life and even economic life of a society. They can obstruct as they could also provoke political, economic and social change. *Charismatic elites* are persons who have extraordinary or charismatic qualities, which enable them to influence action within the society. Their authority is linked to the personality of the individual and not to position or property. In this case, it is what somebody did or what that person is capable of doing that determines the influence he can exert. *Ideological elites* derive their *raison d'être* from their role in the definition and propagation of ideologies and would play a critical role in the articulation of new ideas. They may not necessarily exercise authority but they could be influential. This is the case of both organic intellectuals who are active in formulating alternative revolutionary ideas and counter elites, opposition elites, protesting elites who oppose authorities. Ideological elites announce change in social structure and define orientation in social action. Political or power elites are mostly conservative while ideological and charismatic elites are very innovative by virtue of their absence from positions of authority.

Symbolic elites are often overlooked although they play a very important part in social action. The greater proportion of elites is symbolic because most elites symbolise certain typical traits (values, behaviour, aspirations) in the minds of the rest of the people. For instance, political elites would symbolise a course, values and ideas. They are representative of a system or an aspired system. Elites of a purely symbolic nature are persons who are presented as prototypes of certain ways of doing things or incarnate certain qualities and values. This is true of persons in the creative and performing arts such as popular singers, sports men and opinion leaders who may decide to get involved in politics. Of recent, performing artists are active in politics to the extent that they are elected into positions of authority (case of several mayors in Cameroon, governors and even Presidents in America).

The above classification of elites is not exhaustive. One could distribute elites into local, regional, national and international elites according to their sphere of influence. On the whole, elites are involved in the process of decision-making as they are involved in analysing and defining the situation and then proposing decisions to be taken such as elaboration of ideologies. They also provide the model (personality) for action or behaviour – for people in the society to adopt. They are therefore always in an *avant-garde* position in the process of change as they conceptualise, imagine, plan and lead change in their various domains. Some elites of a conservative nature will definitely be on the other side of the dialectic of change or conservation of the status quo. Their struggle for change within a community in the final analysis takes the form of an inter-elite dimension or intra-stratum conflict of different levels of intensity. The multiplication of elites leads to complementary relations and conflicts but is definitely an important factor in change and development.

2.1.2 Economic Development

The concept of economic growth has been viewed differently by different authors and schools of thought. For instance, Angaye (1995) conceives growth to be the same as development and defines economic development as

“the rise in the real per capita income of a country over a long period of time”. However, his definition of economic development is limited because it fails to mention the general level of wellbeing, the distribution of national income as well as other factors of development. Meanwhile, Meier and Baldwin (1957) define economic development as a process whereby real national income of a country is on the increase over a given period of time. To them, processes that lead to the increase in national income are basically a change in the production function of the country and the transfer of resources from one sector of the economy to another where they are more economically productive. Though they however mentioned the increase in national income, Meier and Baldwin (1957) failed to explicitly show how increases in national income are distributed and the various sectors that foster the increase in the national income over time. On his part, Akpaknan (1987) sees economic development as a multidimensional and qualitative process of improving the general welfare of the entire society, usually manifested in desirable changes such as the level of poverty, reduction in level of unemployment, reduction in income inequality, increase in real output, improvement in literacy, health services and socio political consciousness. This conception of Akpaknan however fails to pay attention to the various costs of the process of improving welfare and fails to make an allusion to the opportunity cost of the various changes and their effects.

However, economic development generally refers to the sustained, concerted actions of policymakers and communities that increase the standard of living and economic health of a specific area. Indeed, economic development is the quantitative and qualitative changes in the economy. Such actions can involve multiple areas including development of human capital, critical infrastructure, regional competitiveness, environmental sustainability, social inclusion, health, safety, literacy, and other initiatives. Economic development differs from economic growth in that whereas economic development is a policy intervention endeavour with aims of economic and social well-being of people, economic growth is a phenomenon of market productivity and rise in Gross Domestic Product. Consequently, economic growth is one aspect of the process of economic development.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

The elite theory is a theory which stems from the theory of the state to describe and explain relations of power in contemporary societies. According to this theory, a small segment of the population whose members belong to the economic elite and policy-planning networks holds power which does not emanate from the democratic process (Bottomore, 1993). The group holds important discussion groups, and consequently influence significantly policy decisions in these organizations /groupings.

Following the elite theory even amongst those excluded from the state's traditional networks of power arbitrarily, counter-elites develop amongst them with time. This usually necessitates negotiations between elites and counter elites (Schwartz, 1987).

The aristocratic version of the foregoing theory holds that power emanates from authority in positions held by elites in key economic and political institutions. Equally, these elites are seen to have personal resources (intelligence and skills), and interest in the governments opposed to the rest of the population who lack or have inadequate resources and are not capable of governing themselves. The elites are seen to be resourceful and determined to ensure a proper functioning of the government machinery because if it fails, they stand to lose more.

2.3 Empirical Literature

Alisa (2012) wonders which direction the world should have taken in terms of development if there were no elites. These influential individuals have an important influence in the development of their communities.

Michels (1911) holds that the influence of elites on development originates from their pervasive nature in most societies. In this context they design institutions and largely determine the way economic resources are used. Their role even extends to creating or executing policy as well as defining policies, objectives and directing the conduct of affairs in their communities.

Elites are a channel through which communities receive development assistance from advanced communities. The elite group hold a lot of power and influence that it cannot be by-passed when directing development aid to communities. Even when national elites are skipped in this process local elites will likely be used. However, correctly incorporating the interest of elites who implement or manage development aid would enhance their role and reduce development aid redirection.

Alisa (2012) further traces the evolution of elites from the Italian school to the revival of the elite theory. He highlights the distinction between unified and dis-unified elite groups which accounts for political stability/instability in context of the new elite paradigm showing that where there are so many dis-unified elite groups, this may lead to political instability which slows growth.

Meanwhile identifying who are elites, their channel of influence on economic outcomes and the elements that influence their behaviour are primordial in guaranteeing effective and sustainable development. As concerns who elites are, Murray (2010) and Vieber (2011) observed the emergence of a new class of elites who are richer, more educated and more influential than the rest of the people in the community just as considered to be the ruling class in the old theorization of elites. This suggests that elites can only be reliably identified in comparison to other people in the society. In fact, early theory considered elites to be those highly placed in the distribution of wealth and ruling class. It is the control of productive resources and institutions that elites use to control the rest of their communities by influencing the allocation of both resources and authority. This class can redistribute resources to reduce unemployment and to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor. They equally take important production decisions; act as entrepreneurs / innovators, and tend to increase productivity. In some instances, elites in form of entrepreneurs may over exploit the existing resources of the community compromising their sustainability.

Politically, elites influence economic development. Researchers and intellectuals may not make laws but their works are able to influence policy that allocates resources within a community. Elites design institutions which facilitates participation of the members of the community in the development process.

Robinson (2012) using the experience of Liberia, South Africa, Germany and U.S. holds that national elites develop institutions which reflect their past and persist into the future. In this context the interest of elites in a given period gives rise to rules which influence the growth of the elite class and the path of future development of the whole society.

Amsden (2012) while assuming that the elite class is static, analyses the link between the reaction of this class to institutional change (nationalization) in Argentina and South Korea. She finds an immediate external change in property rights and concludes that where elites are good managers, institutional changes could be exploited positively. In this regard she considers the managerial qualities of the elite to be very important in the development process.

Reis (2012) conducted a survey on Brazilian elites to capture their perception on whether poverty is a serious problem to take responsibility of as do other elites. The results of the study showed that elites recognize poverty as a problem to be addressed but did not take responsibility to solve this problem.

Kalebe-Nyamongo(2012) used a sociological approach to capture the reasons why elites in Malawi are in favour or against pro-poor development policies. He found out that only top government officials often design good poverty reduction policies but fail to implement them. She attributes this failure to implement sound poverty reduction policies to the fact that poverty is enshrined in the social and political norms of the people. She concludes that the elites need to identify themselves with the poor in order to be induced to act on their behalf.

Zang (2012) studied the post 1978 China with the aim to critically examine the contention that political control of economic activities retard growth. In his analysis, he showed that political elites, political stability and historical experiences are important contributors to national growth, and that the motives of China's elites of growth are different from those of autocratic elites elsewhere.

Bourguignon and Verdier (2012) examined the motivations of governing elites to facilitate or increase the ability of the state to collect and redistribute revenue. They found out that the type of ruling elite and the substitutability or complementarities of the assets they control to those owned by non-elites are important determinants of reaction of elites to various economic structures and situations. To this end, they hold that there are increasing returns to elites when they increase state capacity.

In an ethnographic study, Cantens (2012) analysed an externally imposed reform in the customs authority in Cameroon. He posited that corruption maintains elite status in this government agency. He further observed that

corruption is recognized in this institution and a collective money mechanism is put in place to maintain and enhance the elite status. Similarly, Pinhanetz (2012) analysed a sub national tax reform in Brazil which was internally designed and executed with success. She attributes this success to the officials' ability to have had a vision of the reform project.

On how elites interact with non-elites, Wong (2012) examined capacity building in the area of community based development. More specifically, he analysed how different donors involve community based elites in two development projects in Ghana and Bangladesh. The study showed that in incorporating or excluding local elites from development projects is erroneous because there is a dependent relationship between elites and non-elites. He concluded that the best way to reduce or to avoid elites diversion of resources intended for development purposes is to combine the approaches while taking into consideration the interest of the elite class.

The foregoing literature throws light on who the elite is, elite activities, elite behaviour vis-à-vis non elites and their influence on development. From this literature though, the elite is sometimes reproached by the non-elites, they are generally pro-development.

Fonchingong and Fonjong (2003) examined the role of village Development Associations in the Grasslands of Cameroon in national and Community Development. They find members of the community bearing the negative consequences of poor economic performance and the failure of the state to meet their development needs. To this end, they mobilize their own resources in order to increase their standard of living. The present study determines the extent to which elites participate in mobilizing resources for the development of their communities amongst other interventions.

3. METHODOLOGY

This section is devoted to developing the model of elite participation in economic development. It equally discusses the method and procedure used in collecting and analysing data for the study.

3.1 The Economic model

The following economic development equation is adopted in the study:

$$EcoDev_t = f(EliteParticipation_t, X) \quad (1)$$

Where *EcoDev* measures Economic Development and *X* is the matrix of control variables. The formal model is:

$$EcoDev_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 EliteParticipation_i + \beta_2 Peace_i + \beta_3 Government\ action_i + \beta_4 Non\ Governmental\ action_i + \beta_5 Qualityofhealth_i + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

The main independent variable, elite participation in economic development is assumed to have a positive influence on economic development of their localities. The other explanatory variables, including the level of peace, government action, non-governmental action, and quality of health care were equally assumed to have a positive influence on economic development. The dependent variable (economic development) was captured by the respondents perception of the level of development of their locality through an orderly scale variable (very low, low, average, high, very high level of development).

3.2 Data Collection and analysis

The study was carried out on elites drawn out from development associations in all the seven divisions of the North West Region of Cameroon. The population of this study was drawn from 56 Development Associations. The research instrument used was a structured questionnaire. The questionnaire was designed to capture information on the general background of the development associations/communities and to rate the degree of participation of different types of elites in the development process. The convenience sampling technique was used to select the participating development associations in the study. To this effect, the data was collected only from the Development Associations that were readily available and willing to participate in the study.

Precisely, closed ended questions were used with a very low, low, average, high and very high options'. These items were identified from literature and grouped according to the research objectives. The Test-retest reliability for

stability and reliability was used to guarantee the soundness of the research instrument. Both descriptive and inferential statistics were used to analyse the relationship between economic development and the factors (including elites) that affect the economic development of communities. In order to examine the role of elites on local development, the study used the ordered logit estimation technique giving ordered nature of the dependent variable.

4. PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Table 1 below summarises the results from the ordered logit regression analysis.

Table 1: *Role of elite in Economic Development*

| VARIABLES | Dependent Variable : Economic Development |
|------------------------------|---|
| <i>Elite participation</i> | 1.880** (0.784) |
| <i>Peace</i> | 2.053*** (1.330) |
| <i>Government action</i> | 0.676 (0.793) |
| <i>Non-government action</i> | 1.637* (0.870) |
| <i>Quality of health</i> | 1.607** (0.678) |
| <i>Constant cut1</i> | 0.857 (1.170) |
| <i>Constant cut2</i> | 2.811** (1.256) |
| Observations | 54 |

Note: *Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

Source: *Authors from the STATA12 software.*

From the results above, it can be observed that elite participation coefficient is positive which implies that elite participation increases the likelihood in favour of high level of development of their locality. This result is significant at 5% rendering the result useful for policy recommendations. This result can be explained by the fact that elite, through their knowledge, network and financial support can improved on the living conditions of their population by providing job opportunities and providing some social amenities (such as potable water) which in turn will improve on the health condition of the local population. This result also conforms to the finding of Zang (2012) in China.

Further results also reveal that there is a positive relationship between peace and economic development in the North West Region of Cameroon. This result is significant at 1 percent. More precisely, peace significantly increases the probability of local development. This result is in conformity with theoretical expectation and confirms the fact that one of the prerequisites for development of any nation or locality is peace. Nothing great can be achieved in the absence of peace. Peace is associated with less uncertainty which can foster investment. Again, this result is in line with the result of Zang (2012) who discovered that political stability is a significant ingredient for national growth in China.

The coefficient of government action is positive implying that government action increases the likelihood in favour of local development. However, this result was found to be statistically insignificant. In addition, there is a positive effect of non-government action on the likelihood of development in some localities of the North West region. This result is significant at 10% level. This corroborates the result from the elite participation variable. Non-government actions are very vital in promoting development at the local level. Such non-government action may take the form of aid from NGO's or religious groups through the building of social facilities such as health centres, schools, etc.

The last variable is quality of health. As expected, the coefficient of quality of health is positive and statistically significant at 5% level. This result signifies that good health increases the likelihood of local development significantly. This result can be explained by the fact that good health is a necessary condition for a productive labour force which can stimulate local development.

It is worth noting that the overall model is significant given that prob >Chi2 = 0.0000 which implies that the model is globally significant at 1%.

Table 2: Multicollinearity Test

| | Multicollinearity Test | | |
|------------------------------|------------------------|---------|--|
| | VIF | 1/VIF | |
| <i>Elite Participation</i> | 1.06 | 0.94432 | |
| <i>Peace</i> | 1.16 | 0.96026 | |
| <i>Government action</i> | 1.56 | 0.63926 | |
| <i>Non-Government action</i> | 1.35 | 0.74242 | |
| <i>Quality of health</i> | 1.34 | 0.74770 | |
| Mean VIF | 1.29 | | |

Source: Authors from the STATA12 software.

Here, following the rule of thumb (which states that a VIF value greater than 5 to 10 and above indicate multicollinearity), we see that all of our independent variables are all having values less than 5 indicating that our predictor variables are not highly correlated. To check the redundancy of our predictor variables, from our statistic of the tolerance values above, we can see that all their values are more or greater than 0.02 or 0.01+ so, we can conclude that our predictor variables are not correlating with each other and are not redundant, making them a good predictor for the variation of the dependent variable.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics

| Variables | Mean | Standard deviation | Nbre Obs. | Min | Max |
|------------------------------|--------|--------------------|-----------|-----|-----|
| <i>Economic Development</i> | 2.839 | 0.8040 | 56 | 1 | 5 |
| <i>Elite Participation</i> | 3.1636 | 0.9381 | 55 | 1 | 5 |
| <i>Peace</i> | 3.672 | 0.7711 | 55 | 2 | 5 |
| <i>Government action</i> | 2.654 | 0.9664 | 55 | 1 | 5 |
| <i>Non-Government action</i> | 2.607 | 0.9473 | 56 | 1 | 4 |
| <i>Quality of health</i> | 2.123 | 0.8326 | 56 | 1 | 5 |

Source: Authors from the STATA12 software.

The above table shows amongst other aspects the mean levels of development, peace, government action, non-governmental action and elite participation in economic development of communities. It is seen that peace and elite participation in development portray significant high mean levels of contribution to economic development. From the figures of the standard deviations, there is no significant variation in the contribution of the studied variables to economic development. However, the contribution of peace to the development of these communities is stable and more reliable as indicated by the lowest standard deviation.

Table 4: Correlation matrix of dependent variable and independent variables

| | <i>Economic Development</i> | <i>Elite Participation</i> | <i>Peace</i> | <i>Government action</i> | <i>Non-Government action</i> | <i>Quality of health</i> |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|--------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|
| <i>Economic Development</i> | 1 | | | | | |
| <i>Elite Participation</i> | 0,3765* | 1 | | | | |
| <i>Peace</i> | 0,4599* | 0,1485 | 1 | | | |
| <i>Government action</i> | 0,4935* | 0,1044* | 0,2729 | 1 | | |
| <i>Non-Government action</i> | 0,3453 | 0,2331 | 0,1711 | 0,4269* | 1 | |
| <i>Quality of health</i> | 0.6168* | 0.2376* | 0.3403 | 0.1636 | 0.4480 | 1 |

Source: Authors from the STATA12 software.

The results above show a relatively moderate correlation between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables. 37.65% of economic development is explained by elite participation in development. The positive sign

shows a direct relationship. Peace, government action, non-government action and quality of health care are directly related to economic development at 45.99%, 49.35% 34.53% and 61.68% respectively.

Table 5: Comparisons on Development contribution between males and females

Paired t test

| Variables | Nbre Obs. | Mean | Std. Err. | Std.Dev. | [95% Conf. Interval] | |
|------------|-----------|-------|-----------|----------|----------------------|--------|
| Male | 56 | 3.25 | 0.1146 | 0.8581 | 3.0201 | 3.4798 |
| Female | 56 | 2.94 | 0.1179 | 0.8825 | 2.7100 | 3.1827 |
| Difference | 56 | 0.303 | 0.1246 | 0.9326 | 0.5381 | 0.5533 |

Source: Authors from theSTATA12software.

Mean(diff) = mean(male - female) t = 2.4358
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0 degrees of freedom = 55
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0 Ha: mean(diff) != 0 Ha: mean(diff) > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9909 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0181 Pr(T > t) = 0.0091

Results show that males contribute more to development. This could be explained by the fact male elites outweigh female elites in the sample.

Table 6: Comparisons on Development contribution between homes-based elites and Diaspora Elites

Paired t test

| Variables | Nbre Obs. | Mean | Std. Err. | Std.Dev. | [95% Conf. Interval] | |
|------------|-----------|--------|-----------|----------|----------------------|--------|
| Home | 53 | 3.05 | 0.1603 | 1.1670 | 2.7349 | 3.3782 |
| Diasp | 53 | 2.84 | 0.1893 | 1.3782 | 2.4691 | 3.2289 |
| Difference | 53 | 0.2075 | 0.1853 | 1.3496 | -0.1644 | 0.5794 |

Source: Authors from theSTATA12software.

Mean(diff) = mean(home - diasp) t = 1.1195
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0 degrees of freedom = 52
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0 Ha: mean(diff) != 0 Ha: mean(diff) > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8660 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2681 Pr(T > t) = 0.1340

The results show that home-based elites contribute more to development. So, this leads us to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the contribution of elites to the development of their communities.

Table 7: Descriptive statistics of female home-based Elites versus Female diaspora Elites

| Variables | Mean | Standard deviation | Nbre Obs. | Min | Max |
|-----------|-------|--------------------|-----------|-----|-----|
| Male | 3.25 | 0.8581 | 56 | 1 | 5 |
| Female | 2.946 | 0.8825 | 55 | 1 | 5 |
| Home | 3.036 | 1.1541 | 55 | 1 | 5 |
| Diasp | 2.888 | 1.3963 | 54 | 1 | 5 |

Source: Authors from theSTATA12software.

Home-based female elites contribute more to development than those in the diaspora.

Table 8: ANOVA Results

| Source | Partial SS | df | MS | F | Prob> F |
|---------------|------------|-----|--------|------|---------|
| Model | 26.559 | 5 | 5.3118 | 4.55 | 0.0005 |
| Type | 26.559 | 5 | 5.3118 | 4.55 | 0.0005 |
| Residual | 380.654822 | 326 | 1.1676 | | |
| Total | 407.213855 | 331 | 1.2302 | | |
| Number of obs | 332 | | | | |
| R-squared | 0.0652 | | | | |
| Adj R-squared | 0.0509 | | | | |
| Root MSE | 1.0805 | | | | |

Source: Authors from theSTATA12software.

Results show that there exist differences in the contribution of various types of elites. However since ANOVA cannot be used to tell who contributes more, we resort to compare the mean of these forms of elites

Table 9: Descriptive statistics of different types of elites

| Variables | Mean | Standard deviation | Nbre Obs. | Min | Max |
|---------------|-------|--------------------|-----------|-----|-----|
| <i>Trad</i> | 3.375 | 1.2293 | 56 | 1 | 5 |
| <i>Techno</i> | 2.854 | 0.9891 | 55 | 1 | 5 |
| <i>Econ</i> | 2.785 | 1.1072 | 56 | 1 | 5 |
| <i>Charis</i> | 2.618 | 0.9126 | 55 | 1 | 5 |
| <i>Ideo</i> | 2.857 | 1.0690 | 56 | 1 | 5 |
| <i>Sym</i> | 2.462 | 1.1445 | 54 | 1 | 5 |

Source: Authors from the STATA12 software.

The above table shows amongst other aspects the mean levels of the contributions of different types of elites to development. It is seen that traditional, ideological and technocratic elites contribute more to economic development. From the figures of the standard deviations, there is no significant variation in the contribution of the different type of elites to economic development. However, the contribution of the technocratic and charismatic elites to the development of their communities is stable and more reliable as indicated by the low standard deviations.

5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The estimates of the economic development function showed that peace, elite participation, and quality of health care were significantly and positively related to development at the 5% level. Also, government action was significant at 10% while non-governmental action was least significant. The findings of this study showed that there exist differences in the contribution of various types of elites to development. Home-based elites contribute more to development. Amongst this group it was found that traditional, ideological and technocratic elites contribute more to the development of their communities. Equally, male elites were found to contribute more to development.

From these results, a number of policy issues emerge. On the whole, it is important for the communities to tap from the wealth and resources of their elite population in order to accelerate the development of their communities. The elite population should be incorporated at both planning and implementation phases of development projects in the communities. There is need for awareness creation on the important role that elites ought to play in their communities given that to whom society has given much society equally expects much. In this direction communities should encourage those groups of elites who are not enthusiastic in supporting the growth and development of their communities.

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